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IN THE COURT OF CO:M:MON PLEAS 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY 
ALAN DA VIS, Special Administrator 
of the Estate of Samuel H. Sheppard, 
CASE NO. 312322 
Plaintiff, 
v. 






OF STATEMENTS OF SAMUEL H. 
AND MEMORANDUM REGARDING 
ADMISSABILITY OF CHARCTER 
EVIDENCE OF SAMUEL H. 
SHEPPARD 
On February 17, 2000, the State of Ohio filed a memorandum to advise the Court of 
its intention to offer the Coroner Inquest testimony of Samuel H. Sheppard and other statements of 
Samuel H. Sheppard including those made to police investigators and Coroner Sam Gerber. The 
thrust of that memorandum was to set forth that the admission of these statements is not barred by the 
Evid.R. 802, prohibiting the introduction of certain hearsay, because the Sheppard statements do not 
constitute hearsay. The State of Ohio does not offer these statements for the truth of the matters 
asserted. Indeed, the State's position is that the content of the statements were fabricated and that 
the fabrications evolved in the various statements to match the physical evidence and facts as they 
were being uncovered. 
Additionally, the State urged that the very fact that Samuel H. Sheppard told 
inconsistent and evolving lies accounts relevant since such behavior is inconsistent with innocence. 
Regardless of the truth of any aspect of any of the statements, the very fact that the accounts given 
-·-
-
by Samuel H. Sheppard regularly changed is relevant in and of itself. 
This memorandum will further explain the reasons why the statements of Samuel H. 
Sheppard are admissible, particularly in light of the fact that plaintiff has made Samuel H. Sheppard a 
"declarant" in this case by submitting as substantive evidence the hearsay testimony of Samuel H. 
Sheppard. See Evid. R. 806. 
In summary, the statements of Samuel H. Sheppard are admissible because: 
1. They are not being offered by defendant to prove the truth of the 
matters asserted. 
2. The statements are relevant because the question of Samuel H. 
Sheppard's innocence is less likely to be true by the very fact that his 
accounts altered over time. 
3. Hearsay statements of Samuel H. Sheppard have already been 
admitted into evidence. Pursuant to Evid. R. 806, Sheppard's 
credibility as a declarant can now be attacked through his inconsistent 
statements and otherwise. 
4. Inconsistency in statements is established when material fact is 
omitted in some versions when several accounts are given by a 
declarant. 
5. Alternatively, the statements of Samuel H. Sheppard are party 
admissions pursuant to Evid. R. 80l(D)(2)(b). By maintaining this 
action as a survivorship action pursuant to R.C. 2305 .21, the Estate of 
Samuel H. Sheppard has manifested its adoption/belief in the truth of 
the statements of Samuel H. Sheppard regarding the death of Marilyn 
Sheppard. Also, Samuel Reese Sheppard, as trial representative of the 
Estate, has manifested his adoption and belief in the truth of his 
father's statements in a variety of ways, including co-authorship of the 
book "Mockery of Justice." 
Additionally, a question has now arisen as to whether the State of Ohio will be 
permitted to elicit testimony regarding marital discord between Samuel and Marilyn Sheppard and to 
2 
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rebut the character evidence already put into evidence by plaintiff 
As explained below, plaintiff has "opened the door" to the character of Samuel H. 
Sheppard. Moreover, evidence of "other acts" related to Samuel H. Sheppard's marriage are 
admissible to establish the purpose and motive of his conduct which resulted in the death of Marilyn 
Sheppard. 
THE STATEMENTS OF SAMUEL H. 
SHEPPARD ARE NOT OFFERED FOR THEIR 
TRUTH 
The State of Ohio does not contend that the contents of the various statements of 
Samuel H. Sheppard are true. "A statement is not hearsay ifit is admitted to prove that the declarant 
v 
made it, rather than to prove the truth of its contents." State v. Williams (1988), 38 Ohio St. 3d 346, 
348. Irrespective of "the truth" of the contents of the statements, their relevance flows from their 
internal inconsistency, their alteration in account during which material details were added to match 
the discovery by officials of physical or other important facts. 
"It is axiomatic that a statement is not hearsay if it is only offered for the fact that it 
was made, not for the truth of the matter asserted." State v. Workman (8th Dist. 1984), 14 Ohio App. 
3d 385, 392. Plaintiff argues that the statements are hearsay because the State of Ohio advances that 
they were "truly" stated. Plaintiff misses the point. The fact that the statements were "truly" made 
does not qualify the statements as hearsay. They are only hearsay if, after establishing proof that they 
were "truly" stated, the State were to also advocate the truth of the contents of the statement. 
Plaintiff's confused interpretation of the definition of hearsay must be rejected by this Court. 
3 
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PLAINTIFF HAS MADE SAMUEL H. 
SHEPPARD A HEARSAY DECLARANT 
WHOSE CREDIBILITY MAY NO\V BE 
ATTACKED PURSUANT TO EVID. R. 806 
Through various witnesses, including the examination of Fred Drenkhan and the 
testimony off. Lee Bailey, the hearsay testimony of Samuel H. Sheppard has already been admitted 
into evidence. As such, the State of Ohio is now permitted to attack the credibility of Samuel H. 
Sheppard the same as if he had been a testifying witness. Evid. R. 806 provides. in pertinent part: 
(A) When a hearsay statement ... has been admitted in evidence, the 
creditability of the declarant may be attacked ... by any evidence that 
would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a 
witness. 
The credibility of Samuel H. Sheppard is now subject to attack by the State of Ohio by 
all permissible means, including the presentation of inconsistent statements, bias, interest, etc. 
When hearsay testimony is admitted in a trial, particularly, when the declarant of 
hearsay is not presented at trial, Evid.R. 806 operates to alleviate in some degree the disadvantage to 
the adverse party since the jury is not given an opportunity to view the declarant's demeanor or "to 
"""" see his credibility and veracity tested under cross-examination." State v. Klein (1983), 11 Ohio App. 
3d 208, 212. Indeed, the refusal to permit an attack on the credibility of a hearsay declarant is highly 
--prejudicial and has resulted in the reversal of criminal convictions. State v. Klein, supra, at 212. 
(Inasmuch as the trial court received in evidence [ declarant] Emmons' hearsay statement through 
[witness] Taylor's testimony, it committed error prejudicial to [criminal defendant] appellant by 
excluding Emmons' inconsistent written statements offered to impeach him. Reversal [of the 
v' 
conviction] is therefore required.") (State v. Crossen October 18, 1988), 4th Dist. Case No. 902, 
4 
-unreported, (attached) (reversing a conviction and holding that non-testifying "declarant's 
inconsistent prior or subsequent statements, whether oral or written, may be admitted for the 
purposes of impeaching him.") 
The right to impeach a non-testifying declarant pursuant to Evid.R. 806 exists 
irrespective of whether the party against whom the hearsay was admitted objected and even if the 
proponent of the hearsay later argues that the statements were not offered to prove the truth of the 
v 
matter asserted. State v. Watson ( 1991 ), 61 Ohio St. 3d 1, 6-7. In the instant case, the statements of 
Samuel H. Sheppard already admitted into evidence were plainly offered for the truth of their content. 
Additionally, the State of Ohio is entitled to demonstrate to the jury that Samuel H. 
Sheppard told inconsistent versions, including the omission of materials details in his numerous 
.,.,. 
accounts. As stated in State v. Klein, supra, at 212: 
As a prerequisite for admitting prior or subsequent statements for 
impeachment purposes, the proponent must satisfy a threshold 
inconsistency requirement. In Ohio, the rule is a liberal one with 
respect to establishing inconsistency. The threshold inconsistency 
requirement is met if a statement offered for impeachment can be 
interpreted in either of two ways, though only one interpretation is 
actually inconsistent with the testimony of the witness sought to be 
impeached .... Ql1io law recognjw_ contradiction by reference to a 
material fact omitted in a witness' prior or subsequent statement. 
Demonstrating that a declarant has altered versions of their statements is a cornerstone to attacking 
...,,, 
credibility and does not constitute inadmissible hearsay. U.S. v. King (C.A. 6 1993), Case No. 92-
2279, unreported (attached). There, an F.B.I. agent originally testified that he told another agent that 
he had reservations about his identification of the defendant. The agent later testified that he told the 




Defense counsel was entitled to explore this discrepancy, not for the 
truth of the matter asserted, which would be hearsay, but to impeach 
Agent Statlla's credibility by demonstrating to the jury that Agent 
Statlla had altered his testimony. 
Even prior to plaintiff presenting Samuel H. Sheppard as a hearsay declarant, the 
statements of Samuel H. Sheppard would have been admissible because they were relevant (an 
innocent man need not change or alter his story) and not hearsay because they were not offered for 
the truth of their content. Now that Samuel H. Sheppard has become a hearsay declarant, the State 
of Ohio is fully entitled to attack his credibility through use ofinconsistent statements and otherwise. 
MOREOVER, THE STATEMENTS OF 
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD ARE ADMISSIBLE AS 
"ADOPTIVE" PARTY ADMISSIONS 
Evid.R. 801 (D)(2)(b) provides in pertinent part: 
(D) Statements which are not hearsay 
A statement is not hearsay if: 
*** 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a 
party and is ... (b )a statement of which he has manifested his adoption 
or belief in its truth .... 
All that is required for the finding of an adoptive admission is that there be a 
manifestation of the party's intent to adopt another's statement or evidence of the party's beliefin the 
./ 
truth of this statement. U.S. v. Rollins (1988), 862 F.2d 1182, 1296. A manifestation can be by 
words, conduct, or, under certain circumstances, by silence. 
Jn the instant case, plaintiff has been permitted to maintain this action pursuant to R.C. 
6 
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2305.21. That section provides for the survival of certain causes of action despite the death of the 
person entitled to the cause of action. In other words, the Estate "stands in the shoes" of the person 
entitled to the cause of action. By the conduct of initiating a survivorship action, the Estate of 
Samuel H. Sheppard has certainly manifested its adoption and/or belief of the truth of Samuel H. 
Sheppard's statements relative to his claim of innocence and wrongful imprisonment. 
Additionally, while the Adminstrator of the Estate is the nominal party, the real party 
in interest is Samuel Reese Sheppard, a beneficiary of the Estate and the Estate's trial represenative. 
Samuel Reese Sheppard has manifested his belief in his father's innocence and his father's version of 
events in numerable ways, including his co-authoriship of"Mockery ofJustice." An entire thesis of 
that book is the adoption of the statements of Samuel H. Sheppard regarding the circumstances 
surrounding the death of Marilyn Sheppard as true statements establishing the purported innocence of 
Samuel H. Sheppard. 
Evid.R. 801 (D)(2)(b) has operated in a fashion which has contributed to the 
conviction of defendants based upon their "adoption" of statements of others. Certainly, it is no huge 
leap to hold that the rule was also intended to place an estate in a survivorship action squarely in the 




THE PLAINTIFF HAS OPENED THE DOOR TO 
CHARACTER EVIDENCE REGARDING 
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD AND "OTHER ACTS" 
REGARDING THE SHEPPARD MARRIAGE IS 
ADMISSIBLE PURSUANT TO EVID.R. 404(B) 
Plaintiff has presented through the testimony of numerous witnesses evidence that 
Samuel H. Sheppard was supposedly a good, even tempered man with a happy and satisfying 
marriage. Plainly, plaintiff has put Samuel H. Sheppard's character in issue. As such, the State of 
Ohio is permitted to rebut the testimony . 
./ 
In State v. Schmidt (1979), 65 Ohio App. 2d 239, the State introduced testimony in a 
murder case evid~ncit'fgth~~h~ra~ter and re~~ta~e deceased victim as a quiet and peaceable 
"------- - -
person. By doing so, the State had placed the victim's character in issue. The defense counsel, "for 
tactical reasons or otherwise ... did not object to this incompetent evidence introduced by the state. It 
was, therefore, properly admitted in evidence." ML at 242-43. As a consequence, the defendant was 
permitted to offi r count;~ailing evidence ~hat the decedent was neither a good family man ____ , ____ _ 
nor a quiet and peaceable person. The concept of 'opening the door' is based upon a theory that it is 
unjust to prevent a party from introducing irrelevant evidence to rebut irrelevant evidence that was 
...,,/ 
submitted by the opposing party." State v. Croom (8th App. Dist. 1996), Case No. 67135, unreported 
(attached). Plaintiff has placed Samuel H. Sheppard's character in issue and the State of Ohio is 
entitled to rebut that evidence. This case is approaching day six of the trial. No instruction by the 
Court can undue the harm of the admission of character evidence that had already occurred. 
Moreover, "other acts" testimony regarding the Sheppard marriage are independently 
admissible pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B) for the purpose of establishing the reasons and motives 
8 
-actuating Samuel H. Sheppard's conduct which resulted in the killing of his wife Marilyn. The State's 
theory is premised upon one of the most fundamental realities of human relationships and the human 
condition. That is, that long seated infidelities, resentments, disappointments, and feelings of 
entrapment, jealousy, etc. in a marital relationship can lead to bitter anger and violent behavior on the 
part of both partners and can erupt into uncontrolled violence and death. The admission of such 
evidence is relevant and admissible pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B) and particularly warranted since 
\/" 
plaintiff has "opened the door". Evid.R. 404(B) fully applies to civil actions. Tschantz v. Ferguson 
(8th District 1994), 97 Ohio App. 3d 693. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State of Ohio should be permitted to introduce any and 
all statements of Samuel H. Sheppard and any and all evidence regarding his character and the 
conditions of his marriage. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM D. MASON, Prosecuting Attorney 
of Cuyahoga County, Ohio 
1
KATHLEEN A. MARTIN (0040017) 
Litigation Manager, Civil Division 
The Justice Center, Courts Tower 
1200 Ontario Street 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
(216) 443-7785 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A copy of the foregoing Supplemental Memorandum Regarding Admissability of 
Statements of Samuel H. Sheppard and Memorandum Regarding Admissibility of Character Evidence 
of Samuel H. Sheppard was sent by ordinary United States Mail, postage prepaid, to Terry H. Gilbert, 
1370 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113, and also via facsimile transmission to Terry H. Gilbert 
at (216) 621-0427, this JI ~i!ay of February, 2000. 
KATHLEEN A. MAR TIN 
Litigation Manager, Civil Division 
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1996 WL 17314, State v. Croom, (Ohio App. 8 Dist. 1996) 
*17314 NOTICE: RULE 2 OF THE OHIO 
SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE 
REPORTING OF OPINIONS IMPOSES 
RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON THE 
USE OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. 
ST ATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Bernard CROOM, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 67135. 
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga 
County. 
Jan. 18, 1996. 
Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court, No. 
CR-293443. 
Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Cuyahoga County 
Prosecutor, A. S. Dever, Assistant Prosecuting 
Attorney, Louis Brodnik, Assistant County 
Prosecutor, Cleveland, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 
Thomas E. Shaughnessy, Cleveland, for Defendant-
Appellant. 
Bernard Croom, Leavittsburg, prose. 
JOURNAL ENTRY and OPINION 
PATRICIA AND BLACKNION, Judge: 
**1 Defendant-appellant Bernard Croom appeals 
his conviction for murder and assigns ten errors for 
our review. (FNl) Having reviewed the record of the 
proceedings and the legal arguments presented by the 
parties, we affirm the decision of the trial court. The 
apposite facts follow. 
Michele Finklea was found murdered in her home 
on the morning of January 10, 1993. Death was 
caused by thrusts of a sharp instrument to Michele's 
neck, a deep wound through her heart, and 
perforations of the lung, liver, stomach, and back. In 
total, she was stabbed 25 times. 
A jury convicted her son Bernard Croom of the 
murder. The state called several witnesses who 
testified regarding her death, and their observation of 
Croom on that morning. 
Cleveland Paramedic Wayne Lach concluded 
Michele Finklea was murdered as recently as thirty 
minutes before he arrived on the scene. He arrived at 
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4:10 a.m. He observed Michele Finklea's body lying 
on the carpeted floor with her head propped against 
the couch. On the carpet was a large amount of 
blood, which had not dried and was mushy. He also 
noticed the blood on Michele's body was also moist. 
The blood was warm, and from his experience rigor 
mortis had not occurred. 
Lach recited his experience as a paramedic. He had 
been a paramedic for six years. He had worked for 
Cleveland for a year. Before that he had worked for 
various other fire departmems. During his time as a 
Cleveland paramedic, he had observed 15 to 20 
fatalities a month. His education included both Tri-C 
and on the job. Consequently, he offered his opinion 
as to the time of the murder and opined that although 
the stiffness existed in Michele's fingers, no stiffness 
existed in her joints. Moreover, the stiffness in her 
neck was from her head being propped against the 
couch. From this along with the mushy, bloody 
carpet and the lack of dry blood on the carpet and on 
Michele's body, he concluded the time of the murder 
was within a half hour to an hour before he arrived. 
Lach also described Croom's behavior as unusual. 
During his experience with 15 to 20 fatalities as a 
Cleveland Paramedic, he had observed many family 
members of fatality victims. These family members 
would neither make eye contact nor stay in the room 
with the victim. Lach said Croom did both. 
Lach said Croom was more interested in developing 
his theory of the crime event rather than his mother. 
Croom made sure that everyone in the room heard his 
story, even making eye contact, Lach said. Lach, 
furthermore, observed Croom's repetitive yelling 
would end suddenly when he exited the room where 
the body was located. 
Michele Finklea's brother, Alvin Croom, testified 
his sister had been upset with the long hours her sons 
were keeping. She had the only keys to the front 
screen door and had told him she was planning to lock 
them out in the future. He said she was also 
concerned about drugs in her house. 
Homicide Detective John Bornfield found no forced 
entry to the house. The outside and back of the house 
revealed no suspicious entry. On the couch near 
Michele's body, he found a set of house keys. They 
matched the front screened security door and the front 
wooden door. During the police questioning of 
Croom, he said he entered the house with his keys. 
Yet, after he was released from police custody, he 
Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works 
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- called the police to get his mother's keys to lock the 
front door of the house. 
-
-
**2 Detective Bornfield also found a knife handle 
near Michele Finklea's body. The blade was located 
in the dining room. Michele's blood was on the 
broken knife, which was believed to be the murder 
weapon. 
Detective Bornfield observed Michele Finklea's 
body. Her shoulder, neck, and face were covered 
with blood. Gashes were about her body specifically 
the right side and back of her neck. The cuts on her 
arms indicated she either struggled or attempted to 
block the attack. 
Near her body on the couch was a bloody, broken 
crock."Pot. There was a thumb print on the inside of 
the broken piece, which matched Croom's thumb. 
Detective Prinz stated it was in a position consistent 
with having been placed there either before 
construction or after it was broken. 
Blood was on the walls in the living room, dining 
room, and kitchen. It was on the banister going into 
the upstairs. No blood was found in the victim's 
room. Her room was reasonably undisturbed. 
Money was on the dresser. 
Croom's room was ransacked, and he claimed 
money had been taken. A blanket with a drop of 
blood on it was found in one of the opened dresser 
drawers. 
Later Croom's hands were examined for blood. 
Blood was found in his fingernails and cuticles. The 
blood analysis from the crime scene and Croom 
revealed Michele's blood on the crockpot, on 
Croom's jeans, on the broken knife, and on the 
blanket in Croom's room. Blood was also on the 
pillowcase near Michele's purse, which was Croom's 
blood. 
In the last bedroom, three year old Oliver Finklea, 
Jr. was located. He had been asleep. He shared this 
room with his other brother who was in the hospital 
suffering from a gunshot wound. 
In a statement to the police, Croom said he left 
home at midnight and returned at 4:00 a.m. He 
entered the house with his key and found his mother's 
purse open on the dining room table. In the living 
room, he found his mother. He immediately exited 
the house to seek help from the neighbors. He 
Page 2 
returned, lifted his mother's head, and knew she was 
dead. He said Oliver was in his mother's room 
asleep. Barnfield noticed Croom's jeans were torn on 
the right knee, and he had blood on his thigh. 
Barnfield asked him if he touched anything. He 
adamantly said "No." Croom told Bornfield the killer 
knew his mother because she would not allow a 
stranger to enter her home. 
Barnfield arrested Croom because of the 
inconsistency in his statement. He removed his pants 
and jacket. The jacket had blood on the left shoulder, 
but not the sleeves where Croom had said he cradled 
his mother. Barnfield also noticed a fresh, untom 
scratch mark on Croom's neck. 
Croom called the coroner to learn, if any, skin 
evidence was found under his mother's fingernails. 
Croom spoke with Detective Kovacic on the day he 
went to the station to obtain his mother's keys. While 
there he offered to Kovacic his belief as to how his 
mother was murdered. He said his mother would not 
allow a stranger in her house, and the killer used 
short, rapid thrusts with a knife to inflict the wounds. 
He explained he was not afraid to stay in the house 
because the killer was someone his mother knew. 
The officer was impressed that Croom so accurately 
portrayed how Michele was murdered. 
**3 Three year old Oliver Finklea, Jr. had told his 
father Oliver Finklea, Sr. that Bernard had killed his 
mother. However, Croom had told Oliver, Sr. that 
his brother did not see anything. 
At trial, during questioning by the prosecution, 
Oliver, Sr. testified his son had identified the 
murderer. On cross-examination the defense asked 
about William Blunt, and whether he knew that Blunt 
was a suspect. Oliver, Sr. replied "yes." On 
redirect, the prosecution asked if Blunt was the person 
his son identified, and Oliver, Sr. said "No." On re-
cross, the defense asked if Oliver, Jr. had been 
inconsistent in his identification of the murder. 
Oliver, Sr. said "No." Thereafter, the court allowed 
the prosecution to ask who Oliver, Jr. consistently 
identified, and Oliver, Sr. said "he first said it was a 
black man and then he said it was 'Ber."' Oliver, Sr. 
said he identified Bernard Croom as the killer. 
Croom, during questioning by the police, was asked 
if he killed his mother. He never denied it, he simply 
asked to take a lie detector test. During the interview 
the police described Croom as emotionless, cool, and 
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